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The Spillover E¤ects of Innovative Ideas on
Human Capital
Bar¬¸s Alpaslan and Abdilahi Ali
Abstract
This paper extends a two-period Overlapping Generations model of endoge-
nous growth where the interactions between public infrastructure and human
capital with R&D activities, and growth are studied. The paper makes two
important contributions. First, it accounts for the spillover e¤ect of the stock
of ideas on learning which in turn promotes the production of innovative tech-
nologies. In doing so, it brings to the fore a two-way interaction between
human capital and innovation. The paper then applies various econometric
methods, which conrm the above theoretical thesis. Second, the solutions
of the model emphasise the important role public spending on infrastructure,
human capital and R&D can play in promoting economic growth. However,
the ndings also show that trade-o¤s in the allocation of public spending may
inevitably emerge. In particular, investment in public infrastructure at the
expense of spending on R&D is less likely to succeed in promoting economic
growth, whereas it may be more e¤ective to foster growth through an o¤-
setting cut in another productive component, namely, education. In light of
these potential trade-o¤s, governments in low-income countries need to use
their limited budgets as part of holistic measures in order to achieve e¢ cient
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Technological progress in developing countries has beneted greatly from the increase
of globalisation due to the adoption and adaptation of pre-existing technologies im-
ported from more advanced economies. Developing countries are, however, impeded
in their ability to promote the growth of technological sectors due to lack of human
capital and other complimentary factors. In recent years, there has been an increas-
ing amount of literature on the link between human capital, innovation, and growth.
Several studies have shown that innovation and human capital accumulation are es-
sential instruments for growth, emphasising the complementarity between these two
factors in the process of economic development (see for instance, Romer, 1990; Gross-
mann and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Redding, 1996; Arnold, 1999;
Funke and Strulik, 2000; Strulik, 2005; Grossmann, 2007; Iacopetta, 2010; Gómez,
2011; Sequeira, 2011; Chen and Funke, 2013; Gómez and Sequeira, 2013).
So far, however, there has been little discussion on the link between public cap-
ital and human capital, innovation activities, and growth. In this paper, we argue
that the interplay between these important factors is crucial. In fact, lack of access
to physical infrastructure, including electricity, transport networks, and telecommu-
nications, continues to impede the ability of, particularly, low-income countries to
absorb foreign ideas and develop new ideas that would result in new and e¢ cient
technologies which could be disseminated nation-wide, and thereby fuelling their
economies. Conversely, in many countries, governments have used information and
communication technologies (ICTs) to promote innovation and human capital by
upholding the free ideals of the Internet, thereby allowing other sectors to develop
the ability to provide services, such as distance education and telemedicine etc.
The rst systematic study in which education and innovation as well as public
capital are all determinants of long-run growth was reported by Agénor and Neanidis
(2015) within the context of a two-period Overlapping Generations (OLG) model.
In their study, numerical calibrations and panel data regressions show that public
capital has direct as well as indirect e¤ects on growth through productivity, human
capital accumulation, and innovation capacity.
The objectives of this paper are two-fold. First, we examine how the stock of
technical knowledge or innovated ideas a¤ect the accumulation of human capital.
1
In particular, we account for the spillover e¤ects of the stock of ideas on learning,
emphasising the important role previously innovated ideas can have in promoting
human capital; in doing this, we bring to the fore a two-way interaction between hu-
man capital and innovation, conrming the existence of the so-called implementation
innovation. In pursuing the above objective empirically, we extend the theoretical
model presented in Agénor and Neanidis (2015), augmenting their human capital
sector equation with a parameter capturing the stock of technical knowledge and
thus the externality of innovative activities. We then test the central predictions
emanating from the above theoretical model using recently developed panel cointe-
gration techniques on a sample of 35 high-income economies over the period 1980 
2014. Our empirical strategy takes into account issues such as cross-sectional het-
erogeneity and endogeneity concerns. Moreover, we estimate panel error correction
model to ascertain the short- and long-run dynamics in the relationship. Finally, we
rely on panel Granger causality tests to determine whether the relationship is of a
causal nature.
Second, given the pressing need of low-income economies to improve their tech-
nological sectors, we explore whether there are possible trade-o¤s in the allocation
of public expenditure between infrastructure investment and other productive com-
ponents of public spending, that is, education and R&D activities. We illustrate this
issue by applying numerical analysis using average data for low-income countries.
Finally, unlike Agénor and Neanidis (2015) who only analyse the long-run balanced
growth path, in this paper, we study the transitional dynamics of the model, which
enable us to trace the path of the variables after a shock to the steady-state. Thus,
we are able to fully capture the important interactions between public capital, human
capital, and economic growth from the perspective of public policy.
Based on our empirical analysis, we nd that the stock of ideas form a long-run
equilibrium relation with human capital. Our panel error correction model indicates
the existence of a long-run positive bidirectional relationship between innovation
and education, conrming the so-called implementation innovation. These results
remain robust when we extend the specication and apply other estimators such as
the pooled OLS, random e¤ects, Feasible GLS as well as system GMM.
Our numerical analysis, where we use average data for low-income countries, indi-
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cates the existence of potential trade-o¤s associated with the provision of infrastruc-
ture and other productive components of public spending. The results suggest that
government interventions may indirectly a¤ect the capacity of sectors to innovate
through spillover e¤ects. However, investment in public infrastructure at the ex-
pense of spending on R&D is less likely to succeed in promoting economic growth,
whereas it may be more e¤ective to foster growth through an o¤setting cut in another
productive component of public spending, namely, education.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review
of the relevant literature. Section 3 lays out the theoretical framework of the paper,
including the main equation in the human capital sector of the model presented in
Agénor and Neanidis (2015) in which we incorporate the externality of the stock of
technical knowledge. Section 4 calibrates the model, where we illustrate, through
several experiments, the impact of public policy, including potential trade-o¤s be-
tween productive components of public spending. Section 5 empirically explores the
relationship between the stock of knowledge and human capital. Finally, Section 6
o¤ers some concluding remarks and policy implications.
2 Literature Review
A large body of research, particularly within the endogenous growth literature, has
stressed the important role innovation and capital accumulation (both human and
physical) play in explaining (long-run) economic growth (Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991;
Grossmann and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Innovation is as-
sociated with knowledge assets and processes, which can be converted into new re-
sources that have economic payo¤s (McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2013). Innovative
ideas (i.e. the stock of [technical] knowledge) and human capital are closely related
through interactive processes. In this context, a distinction is usually made between
the creation of new knowledge and its di¤usion (Schumpeter, 1943) which can result
in knowledge spillovers and externalities (De Dominicis et al., 2013). At the heart
of these informational spillovers is learning and, thus, human capital (Romer, 1986;
Lucas, 1988; Dakhli and De Clercq, 2004). As argued by Aghion and Howitt (1998,
ch.3), therefore, there is a close interaction between human capital and innovation.
The overwhelming majority of the literature focuses on how human capital inu-
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ences innovation. This issue is theoretically straightforward in that human capital is
an important input in the generation and di¤usion of innovative ideas. For example,
Dakhli and De Clercq (2004) explore the e¤ects of two forms of capital, namely hu-
man capital and social capital, on innovation using a sample of 59 countries. Their
results show that human capital has positive and signicant e¤ects on innovation
unlike social capital. Focusing on the United States, Chellaraj et al. (2008) show
that the presence of foreign graduate students has positive and signicant impacts
on both patent grants and applications. Other studies show that innovation is posi-
tively related to R&D, nancial development and institutional quality (Bottazzi and
Peri, 2007; Ang, 2011).
However, little research has been done on how the stock of technical knowledge
(i.e. number of ideas innovated) a¤ects the accumulation of human capital. As al-
luded to above, there are two broad reasons why human capital may benet from
innovation. First, new technological inventions have the tendency to create new eco-
nomic opportunities which can change the incentive structures, enticing economic
agents to improve their skills and expertise (Zeng, 2003). Second, as emphasised
by the regional economics literature, geography and spatial proximity are impor-
tant determinants of the creation and di¤usion of new ideas (De Dominicis et al.,
2013). This is because geographical proximity tends to encourage learning processes
through mechanisms of knowledge spillovers (ibid, p.2). Hence, agents located in
the same region tend to benet more from dynamic information externalities given
that information within the same locality tends to ow more smoothly. Therefore, a
two-way link between innovation and human capital may exist.
One of our main objectives in this paper is to explore theoretically and empirically
how the stock of knowledge inuences human capital accumulation and whether there
is indeed a two-way relationship between the two i.e. the so-called implementation
innovation. As far as we are aware, the only paper that has previously examined
this issue is by Faggian and McCann (2009). In that study, the authors explore
the relationship between graduate human capital and innovation in British regions.
Their results indicate that there is indeed a two-way link; innovative regions tend
to attract a high amount of graduate human capital while the inow of graduate
human capital tends to improve regional innovation. However, their result is only
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robust once London is included and Scotland is excluded. Moreover, they use a single
cross section dataset.
In this paper, we apply recently developed panel cointegration techniques to
examine the (long-run) relationship between the stock of ideas and human capital.
Unlike the study by Faggian and McCann (2009), our empirical exercise is based
on a tractable theoretical model based on the work by Agénor and Neanidis (2015).
In particular, we augment their human capital sector equation with a parameter
capturing the stock of (technical) knowledge. We retain the rest of their original
model for consistency but also because we want to explore two more issues; (1)
as we are interested in whether there is a two-way relationship between innovation
and human capital, their R&D sector equation is of interest to us as it will be
clearer later on, and (2) in light of our second objective, we want to study the
transitional dynamics of their model given that we are interested in examining the
potential trade-o¤s associated with public spending, particularly with respect to
public infrastructure and other productive components of public expenditure (R&D
investments and education). This issue is particularly important for low-income
countries as our numerical analyses conrm.
3 Theoretical Framework
In line with Agénor and Neanidis (2015, p.253), we consider a two-period (adulthood
and old age) OLG model of endogenous economic growth where the economy is pop-
ulated by nonaltruistic individuals, rms and a government. The economy has four
sectors: nal good, intermediate inputs, human capital, and R&D. The government
cannot borrow but runs a balanced budget in each period. However, it nances its
spending on investment in infrastructure, education, R&D activities, and other items
by taxing only wage incomes of adult workers. Wages in the second period of life are
the source of income and savings are in the form of physical capital. Agents are only
endowed with an initial stock of physical capital at the beginning of each period.
Total population is assumed to be constant and the number of adult workers is set
to N . And nally, all markets clear in equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the detailed description of the theoretical model
developed by Agénor and Neanidis (2015, pp.253-256) in which we incorporate the
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externality of the stock of technical knowledge, as noted earlier: individuals, nal
goods sector, intermediate goods sector, human capital accumulation, research and
development sector, government, market-clearing conditions, and dynamic equilib-
rium, respectively.
Individuals:
The discounted utility of an individual born at t is given by
Ut = C ln c
t
t +
ln ctt+1
1 + 
; (1)
where ctt+j denotes consumption at period t + j of a person born at the beginning
of period t, with j = 0; 1,  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and the parameter
C > 0 is the individuals preference for current consumption.
The period-specic budget constraints are given by
ctt + st = (1  )etwt; (2)
ctt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st; (3)
where wt is the economy-wide wage rate, et individual human capital,  2 (0; 1) a
constant tax rate, st the savings, and rt+1 the rate of return on holding (physical)
assets between periods t and t + 1. Individuals maximise equation (1) subject to
their intertemporal budget constraint with respect to ctt and c
t
t+1, taking prices as
given.
Final Goods Sector:
The nal good is produced by using e¤ective labour, EtNYi;t, where Et, the product
of average human capital of individuals born in t  1 and NYi;t, employment, private
capital,KP;it , public infrastructure,K
I
t , and a combination ofMt intermediate inputs,
xis;t, where s = 1; :::Mt:
Y it = [
KIt
(KPt )
K (NYt )
N
]"(KP;it )
(EtN
Y
i;t)
[
MtX
1
(xis;t)
]=; (4)
where " > 0; ; ;  2 (0; 1); the elasticities with respect to public-private capital
ratio, private capital, e¤ective labour, and intermediate goods, respectively, and
 +  +  = 1 (assuming constant returns to scale in private inputs),  2 (0; 1) the
parameter that determines the demand elasticity and therefore 1=(1  ) > 1 is the
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absolute value of the elasticity of demand for each intermediate good, the parameters
K ; N > 0measure the strength of congestion e¤ects for the aggregate private capital
stock and the total number of workers in the nal goods sector, respectively, KPt =R 1
0
KP;it di the aggregate private capital stock, and N
Y
t =
R 1
0
NYi;tdi total employment
in the nal good sector.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the aggregate output of the nal good is
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y it di = (N
Y
t )
 "N (
KIt
KPt
)"(
Mt
KPt
)=(
Et
KPt
)xt (K
P
t )
+=++"(1 K); (5)
or by implication,
Yt = (k
I
t )
"m
=
t z

t x

tK
P
t ; (6)
where KPt = K
P;i
t , 8i, + =+ "(1  K) = 1 and   "N = 0, kIt = KIt =KPt is the
ratio of public capital to private capital, mt =Mt=KPt is the knowledge-capital ratio,
and zt = Et=KPt is the human capital-private capital ratio.
Intermediate Goods Sector:
Prot of each intermediate-good producer, Is;t, is
Is;t = (p
s
t   )xs;t; (7)
where pst a fee monopolistically competitive rms in the intermediate sector should
pay to use the patent of each input s to R&D sectors,  unit of the nal good that is
required for production of each unit of an intermediate good s, and xs;t the optimal
quantity of each intermediate good demanded by producers of the nal good.
Human Capital Accumulation:
Our main contribution in this paper is that we incorporate the role innovative ideas or
stock of technical knowledge play in the human capital sector. We follow Agénor and
Neanidis (2015) in that we assume that individuals devote their time to education
in the rst period of their lives and that their human capital is produced using a
combination of government spending on education per worker, GEt = N , where N the
number of adults, the average human capital of the previous generation, Et, and
access to public capital or public infrastructure, kIt , which is subject to congestion
measured by the aggregate private capital stock. Assuming constant returns to scale
for tractability, human capital of individuals is
et+1 = (
GEt
N
)1M 2t E
1 1 2
t (k
I
t )
3 ; (8)
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where 1 2 (0; 1) and 2; 3 > 0; the elasticities with respect to public spending
on education, externality of technical knowledge and public-private capital ratio,
respectively, and in a symmetric equilibrium, et = Et.
However, as can be seen from equation (8) and unlike Agénor and Neanidis (2015),
in this paper we account for the spillover e¤ect of the existing stock of ideas, Mt on
learning. This creates a positive externality for future R&D activities although it is
subject to diminishing returns. Hence, as shown later, the production of new designs
is positively correlated with average human capital of individuals in the economy.
Thus, there is a two-way interaction between human capital and innovation or the
so-called implementation innovation, as noted earlier.
In our empirical section (Section 5), we test the above theoretical proposition
using mainly a reduced form model which links the accumulation of human capital
to the stock of (technical) knowledge in the long run. However, we also examine how
the stock of knowledge a¤ects human capital, controlling for per capita education
expenditure, public infrastructure and the average human capital of the previous
generation, as postulated by equation (8).
Research and Development Sector:
The production of new designs that rms generate for new intermediate inputs is
given by:
Mt+1  Mt = (G
R
t
Et
)1(
Mt
Et
)2(kIt )
3
EtN
R
t
N
; (9)
where GRt government spending on R&D, EtN
R
t e¤ective labour which is scaled
by total population N to capture a dilution e¤ect as in Dinopoulos and Thompson
(2000), kIt public-private capital ratio which is subject to congestion, as noted earlier,
1; 2 2 (0; 1), 3 > 0; the elasticities with respect to government spending on R&D,
existing stock of ideas and public-private capital ratio, respectively. Both government
spending and the existing stock of ideas are scaled by the average human capital.
This is because, as general knowledge increases, the marginal benet of an increase in
government spending or existing stock of ideas becomes less relevant for innovation
activities, as discussed in Agénor and Neanidis (2015, p.256). Hence, human capital
is critically important for the production and di¤usion of new technologies. Using
dynamic panel causality analysis, we later test this thesis empirically.
Government:
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Government cannot borrow and thus nances its expenditure through taxes on wages,
so its balanced budget is given by:
Gt =
X
Ght = etwt
N; h = E; I;R; U (10)
where GEt spending on education, G
I
t on infrastructure investment, G
R
t on R&D
activities and GUt on unproductive items,  constant tax rate, wt the economy-wide
wage, et individual human capital, and N the number of adults, as noted earlier.
It is assumed that each share of public spending is set as a constant fraction of
government revenues:
Ght = hetwt
N; h = E; I;R; U (11)
where h 2 (0; 1) for all j.
Equations (10) and (11) give X
h
h = 1: (12)
Public capital in infrastructure:
KIt+1 = G
I
t ; (13)
where for simplicity full depreciation is assumed.
Market-Clearing Conditions:
The asset market clearing condition is
KPt+1 =
Nst; (14)
where st is savings per household, N is the number of adults, and for simplicity full
depreciation is assumed.
Labour market equilibrium condition is
NRt +N
Y
t = N; (15)
where perfect labour market mobility, wYt = w
R
t , and full employment are assumed.
Dynamic System:
Appendix A shows that the public-private capital ratio, kIt , is constant over time
and the dynamic system is comprised of two rst-order di¤erence equations in mt =
9
Mt=K
P
t , the knowledge-capital ratio and zt = Et=K
P
t , the human capital-private
capital ratio, as in Agénor and Neanidis (2015). The dynamic system behaves
in a complex nonlinear fashion, therefore its stability cannot be studied analyti-
cally; however, the stability can be veried numerically once the model is calibrated.
4 Calibration and Policy Experiments
To study the transitional dynamics of the model and the steady-state e¤ects of public
policies, the model is calibrated. For households, the annual discount rate,  is set
at 0:04, which is standard in the literature. Interpreting a period as 25 years in this
OLG framework yields the intergenerational discount factor [1=(1+0:04)]25 = 0:375.
The familys propensity to save,  = 1=[1 + C (1 + )] is set at 0:12, as in Agénor
and Dinh (2015). Using this denition, C = (
 1   1)=(1 + ) can be calibrated at
2:75. The elasticity of production of nal goods with respect to public-private capital
ratio, " is set equal to 0:17 which is consistent with the value reported by Bom and
Ligthart (2014, Table 4), whereas the elasticity with respect to e¤ective labour, 
is assumed to be 0:65, as in Agénor and Dinh (2015). However, the elasticity with
respect to private capital,  is set equal to 0:2 and thus, the elasticity with respect
to intermediate inputs,  = 1     is equal to 0:15.
Unlike Agénor and Neanidis (2015), in this paper the parameter  = 0:61 which
determines the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is similar to the
value reported by Iacopetta (2011) and Chen and Funke (2013, Table 1). In the
R&D sector, the elasticity with respect to existing stock of ideas, 2 is slightly lower
than their value; it is set equal to 0:6 to begin with, whereas in the human capital
sector, the elasticity with respect to public-private capital ratio, 3 is set equal to
0:0 in the benchmark case; a sensitivity analysis with respect to both parameters is
reported later on.
The tax rate on nal output is equal to 0:151, which corresponds to the average
ratio of tax revenues to GDP for low-income countries (see Baldacci et al. (2004,
Table 1)). To match the models denition, this value is divided by the average
share of labour income in nal output,  = 0:65 so the e¤ective tax rate on wages
is  = 23:2 percent. The initial share of government spending on education, E is
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set at 17:1 percent which is consistent with the value used by Agénor and Alpaslan
(2013).
The values of the remaining parameters used in this paper are consistent with
the values reported by Agénor and Neanidis (2015). The benchmark values for the
parameters are summarised in Table 1. Using these values and starting values for the
dynamic variables; the technical knowledge-private capital ratio, mt = Mt=KPt and
human capital-private capital ratio, zt = Et=KPt , the dynamic system is solved nu-
merically and the model proved to be stable. A multiplicative constant is introduced
in the growth equation and the steady-state growth rate of nal output is calibrated
at 3:3 percent per annum, the average growth rate of low-income countries over the
period 1975-2000 (see Baldacci et al. (2004)). Figures 1a;b in show that the tech-
nical knowledge-human capital ratio and growth rate of nal output, both of which
have a monotonic pattern, converge to a steady-state value in the benchmark case,
and therefore all experiments are conducted from the period where the economy is
initially in a steady-state equilibrium.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameter Values: Benchmark Case
Parameters
Individuals  = 0:04;  = 0:12; C = 2:75
Final goods sector " = 0:17;  = 0:2;  = 0:65;  = 0:15
Intermediate goods sector  = 1:0;  = 0:61
Human capital accumulation 1 = 0:3; 2 = 0:3; 3 = 0:0
R&D sector 1 = 0:2; 2 = 0:6; 3 = 0:0
Government  = 0:232; I = 0:061; E = 0:171; R = 0:05
Transportation costs '0 = 0:2; '1 = 0:0
[Figure 1(a,b) about here]
To characterise the results of the policy experiments, we focus on the following
variables: public-private capital ratio, technical knowledge-human capital ratio, and
growth rate of nal output. Consider rst the case of public policy aimed at pro-
moting access to infrastructure, by investing in rural roads, power grids, etc. This
is captured by a budget-neutral increase in the share of public expenditure on in-
frastructure investment, I , from an initial value of 0:061 to 0:081, under alternative
assumptions: rst, nanced by a cut in unproductive spending in which case there
are no trade-o¤s (dI + dU = 0); second, nanced by a cut in other productive
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components of public spending, namely, either education (dI + dE = 0) or R&D
activities (dI + dR = 0), the case where we consider trade-o¤s that policymakers
face. We rst critically discuss the long-run e¤ects then go on to the transitional
dynamics.
4.1 The Long-run E¤ects of Public Policy
Table 2 shows the ndings of these experiments for the benchmark case, as shown in
red bold in the table, as well as alternative values of some key parameters. Consider
rst the benchmark results in the case where an increase in I is nanced by a cut in
unproductive spending, U . With the initial values of 3 = 0:0 and 3 = 0:0, in the
long run, the results indicate that the direct e¤ect of an increase in infrastructure
investment is of course an increase in the public-private capital ratio J (which is
constant over time and rises overall from an initial value of 0:1538 to 0:2042), thereby
promoting growth through its e¤ect on the productivity of private inputs in the nal
goods sector; the solution of the model gives a steady-state (long-run) growth rate
of 4:2 percent, that is, an increase of 0:98 percentage points in comparison with the
baseline value. Table 2 also shows higher values of 3 = 0:1 and 3 = 0:1, both of
which generate a positive growth rate of nal output; in the case where 3 = 0:1, the
net impact on growth is equal to about 1:9 percentage points, whereas it is in the
order of 1:6 percentage points when 3 = 0:1.
[Table 2 about here]
In the second scenario, as shown in Table 2, an increase in the share of spending
on infrastructure investment, I , nanced by a cut in spending on education, E,
has a net negative e¤ect on steady-state growth; growth falls by 0:19 percentage
points. Although an increase in the share of spending on public infrastructure has
a direct, positive e¤ect on human capital accumulation, nancing higher spending
on infrastructure investment through a cut in the share of spending on education
hampers growth because the fall in the level of human capital lowers the private
capital stock.
In order to illustrate the potential trade-o¤s that may arise in the reallocation of
spending across productive outlays, two key parameters are focused on: the elasticity
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of human capital with respect to public-private capital ratio, 3 and the elasticity
of the ow of new ideas with respect to public-private capital ratio, 3. When the
elasticity of human capital with respect to public-private capital ratio, 3 is set
equal to a relatively higher value, 0:1, an increase in the share of public spending
on infrastructure investment, I nanced by a cut in E helps to mitigate the trade-
o¤; in fact, the growth rate of nal output turns positive because infrastructure is
more productive than spending on education; growth increases by 0:70 percentage
points. The positive e¤ect on steady-state growth (higher spending on infrastructure
generates) dominates the reduction in human capital accumulation because spending
more on infrastructure leads to the production of productive inputs and therefore the
o¤setting cut in the share of spending on education is benecial in terms of growth.
Regarding the elasticity of the ow of new ideas with respect to public-private capital
ratio, 3, a higher value, 0:1, is also displayed in Table 2. The growth rate of nal
output is also positive and equal to 0:53 percentage points yet less than in the case
where I is nanced by a cut in E.
Besides, the table shows two alternative values of 2 (0:4 and 0:6), which measures
the response of human capital with respect to technical knowledge. Depending on
the relative strength of the parameter 2, nancing a higher share of spending on
infrastructure through a cut in education leads to a fall in the rate of human capital
accumulation, therefore mitigating the benet associated with the externality of
technical knowledge. However, a higher value of 2 = 0:6 may generate a positive
growth rate even if an increase in spending on infrastructure is o¤set by a reduction in
education; growth increases by 0:05 percentage points, whereas when 2 is set equal
to a relatively lower value, 0:4, the trade-o¤ still persists and it cannot generate a
positive growth rate.
Figure 2 shows the impact of changes in the elasticity of human capital with re-
spect to the externality of technical knowledge, 2 and the elasticity of R&D activities
with respect to the existing stock of ideas, 2, either individually or in combination,
on the steady-state growth rate of nal output. In other words, in response to a
permanent increase in infrastructure investment nanced by a cut in education, the
gure shows absolute deviations of the steady-state growth rate of nal output from
baseline for alternative values of 2 and 2, which range from 0:1 to 0:65.
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[Figure 2 about here]
Table 2 also shows that for a combination of higher values of 2 = 0:6 and
2 = 0:7, despite the o¤setting cut in education, as a result of complementarity
e¤ect, the growth rate of nal output in the long run may actually turn positive and
is equal to 0:11 percentage points. Or alternatively, a higher value of 2 = 0:65,
together with a reasonably lower value of 2 = 0:65, may also achieve the same
result. In fact, the externality of technical knowledge associated with human capital
accumulation and its spillover e¤ects on R&D sector may mitigate or even eliminate
the initial adverse e¤ects on the growth rate of nal output in the long run despite
an o¤setting cut in education.
In the last case scenario where a budget-neutral increase in the share of public
expenditure on infrastructure investment, I , is nanced by a cut in another pro-
ductive share of public spending, R, the growth rate of nal output falls by 0:26
percentage points when compared to the baseline value. Despite the fact that better
access to infrastructure has a direct, positive e¤ect on the ability to innovate, higher
share of spending on infrastructure at the expense of R&D discourages growth not
only directly through its e¤ect on R&D activities but also indirectly through lower
government revenues which may also dampen human capital accumulation. In turn,
the lower level of human capital further discourages R&D activities through the ex-
ternality of technical knowledge, thereby impeding growth because spending less on
R&D hampers the production of new designs. An increase either in 3 or in 3 has
a positive impact on growth; growth increases by 0:61 percentage points per annum
in the case where 3 = 0:1, whereas it increases by 0:52 percentage points when
3 = 0:1. Despite an o¤setting cut in R&D activities, spending more on infrastruc-
ture leads to the production of productive inputs and dominates the reduction in
the production of new designs, therefore the net impact on the growth rate of nal
output turns out to be a positive value.
4.2 Transitional Dynamics and Public Policy
Turning now to the experimental evidence on the transitional dynamics of the model,
given that public-private capital ratio is constant over time, Figures 3,4,5 (a,b) show
the time path of technical knowledge-human capital ratio and growth rate of nal
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output in the benchmark case where an increase in the share of spending on invest-
ment infrastructure is o¤set by a cut unproductive spending, education, and R&D
activities, respectively. For instance, Figures 4 (a,b) show that in the case where I
is nanced by a cut in E, on impact, a cut in spending on education leads to the
lower level of human capital which hampers R&D activities through the externality
of technical knowledge. However, at the same time, higher government spending on
public infrastructure has a direct, positive impact on human capital accumulation,
thereby promoting R&D activities. As a result, the ratio of technical knowledge to
human capital increases. Nevertheless, the trade-o¤ persists and the net impact on
the growth rate of nal output is negative. Over time, a positive externality associ-
ated with human capital accumulation promotes R&D activities more. Consequently,
the ratio of technical knowledge to human capital increases by more. However, due to
an o¤setting cut in education, the trade-o¤ still persists and therefore the net impact
on growth remains negative yet the initial adverse e¤ect is considerably mitigated.
[Figures 3,4,5 (a,b) about here]
According to Figures 5 (a,b), on impact, an o¤setting cut in another productive
component of public spending, R, discourages R&D activities, therefore the stock
of technical knowledge falls. At the same time, the lower level of production of new
designs results in lower government revenues, which also leads human capital ratio
to fall. As a result, the ratio of technical knowledge to human capital falls. How-
ever, despite the adverse e¤ect of government spending on education, higher share
of spending on infrastructure investment through its e¤ects on the productivity of
private inputs in the nal good sector promotes growth. Over time, the techni-
cal knowledge-human capital ratio falls by more and the initial increase in growth
is reversed. Despite higher spending on infrastructure, this o¤setting cut in R&D
activities dampens growth not only through its e¤ects on R&D activities but also
through lower government revenues, which adversely a¤ects human capital accumu-
lation. In turn, the lower level of human capital further discourages R&D activities
through the externality of technical knowledge, thereby impeding growth.
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4.3 Summary
To sum up, the model demonstrates the role public infrastructure, human capital
and innovation play in encouraging economic growth. Moreover, it tries to show the
benecial e¤ects public investments can have in augmenting the above determinants
of growth. For instance, the solution of the model clearly indicates that public
infrastructure investments can promote economic growth in the long run via increases
in productivity. However, because most governments, especially those in low-income
countries, face budget constraints that may be binding, potential trade-o¤s arise
in the allocation of public expenditure. In particular, increases in public capital
nanced by a reduction in education spending or R&D spending hampers economic
growth; however, higher share of spending on public infrastructure at the expense of
spending on R&D is less likely to succeed in promoting growth in the long run.
Having established the benecial e¤ects of, among others, innovation and human
capital on growth, in what follows, we empirically examine the relationship between
these important variables.
5 Stock of Knowledge and Human Capital: Em-
pirical Evidence
Our interest centres primarily on the empirical estimation of equation (8). To this
end, we use a balanced panel of 35 high income economies over the period 1980 
2014. The sample selection is based on the availability of consistent data. As we are
interested in the (long-run) relationship between the stock of knowledge and human
capital, we estimate the following parsimonious specication:
HCit = i + SKit + "it (16)
where HCit is human capital for countries i = 1; ::::N and time periods t = 1; ::::T ,
i is a country specic xed e¤ect and "it is the error term. Our dependent variable
is a relatively new measure of human capital based on the average years of schooling
as well as an assumed Mincerian rate of return to education sourced from version 8.1
of the Penn World Tables. SKit is a measure of the production of innovative ideas.
We follow the existing literature and use patent count as a proxy for the stock of
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knowledge (see for example, Bottazzi and Peri, 2007; Madsen, 2008; Chellaraj et al.,
2008; Ang, 2011). We apply perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of
10% as in Ang (2011). The initial level of patent stocks are estimated as SK0=(g+),
where SK0 denotes the knowledge stock in the rst available year, g is the average
annual geometric growth rate over the sample period, and  is the depreciation rate.
The patent data comes from the World Intellectual Property Organisation, World
Development Indicators and the OECD. Summary statistics as well as the list of
countries in the sample can be found in Appendix B.
To estimate (16), we rely on recently developed panel cointegration methods that
are robust to endogeneity issues, omitted variable bias, and measurement issues (Bal-
tagi and Kao, 2000; Phillips and Moon, 2000). However, for specication (16) to be
valid, we need to establish that both variables are nonstationary or, more precisely,
integrated of the same order. In that case, they would constitute a cointegrating vec-
tor as they would have a stationary error term; any relevant omitted variable would
be captured by the errror term, leading to a failure to reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Provided there is a cointegration between
the stock of knowledge and human capital, therefore, such (long-run) relationship
should remain even if equation (16) is augmented with additional variables (for a
discussion on this, see for example, Herzer, 2012).
5.1 Integration and Cointegration Analyses
The integration analysis begins with an investigation of the properties of the vari-
ables. For this purpose, we employ three di¤erent types of panel unit root tests,
namely, the Fisher-type ADF test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW), the
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) test, and the cross-sectionally augmented ADF
test statistic developed by Pesaran (2007) (CIPS). While all three tests assume in-
dividual unit root processes, the IPS test allows for serial correlation in the error
term while the CIPS allows for cross-sectional dependence as well. All the tests as-
sume the non-stationarity of the series under the null hypothesis. The results, which
are shown in panel A of Table 3, suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root in levels, implying that the series are non-stationary. However, the
series attain stationarity in rst-di¤erences, indicating that they are integrated of
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order one, I (1). It should be noted that the human capital variable does not achieve
stationarity once we control for cross-sectional dependence (CIPS test) among the
countries stemming from, for example, common shocks. With this in mind, we go
ahead with our panel cointegration analyses.
[Table 3 about here]
To conrm whether the long-run relationship captured in equation (16) exists,
we apply two panel cointegration tests. The rst is the Pedroni (2004) test which
allows for heterogeneity in the long-run cointegrating vectors while capturing both
the within- and between-dimensions of the panel via seven di¤erent test statistics.
The second is the test proposed by Westerlund (2007) which can account for any
potential cross-sectional dependence. The results which are summarised in panel B
of Table 3 show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is strongly rejected.
Thus, the evidence points to a long-run relationship between the stock of knowledge
and human capital.
5.2 Long-run Estimates
Given that we found a cointegration between the stock of knowledge and human
capital, we now attempt to shed light on the nature of the relationship captured in
equation (16). For this purpose, we employ the within-dimension dynamic OLS (WD-
DOLS) estimator proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000). Even though this estimator
overcomes issues such as serial correlation and endogeneity concerns, it pools the
slope coe¢ cients across countries. This homogeneity assumption, if not justied,
can lead to a serious bias (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Hence, we also apply the mean-
group DOLS (MG-DOLS) estimator developed by Pedroni (2001) which allows for
heterogeneous slopes whilst having better small sample properties. Finally, we use
the two-step estimator of Breitung (2005) which is based on a VAR set-up and thus
allows for dynamic e¤ects.
[Table 4 about here]
The results on the long-run e¤ects of the stock of knowledge on human capital are
reported in Table 4. Across all the estimators, we consistently nd that the stock
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of knowledge has a positive impact on the accumulation of human capital. This
e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5% level and the long-run elasticities range
between 0.020 and 0.045. Hence, these results are consistent with the predictions
of our theoretical proposition that the spillover e¤ects of the stock of ideas can
have benecial inuences on human capital accumulation. As we argued previously,
this could suggest that new technological inventions create new incentive structures,
enticing economic agents to improve their skills and expertise. Alternatively, the
creation and di¤usion of new ideas can promote learning through knowledge spillovers
and dynamic information externalities.
5.3 Dynamic Panel Causality
Having established that the stock of knowledge has a positive and signicant long-
run e¤ect on human capital, our interest lies in examining whether there is indeed
a two-way interaction between innovation and human capital  the so-called im-
plementation innovation. Some of the literature reviewed in Section 2 as well as
our theoretical model (see equations [8] and [9]) postulate the existence of such a
two-way relationship.
To examine this, we set up a dynamic panel error correction model (Engle and
Granger, 1987; Pesaran et al. 1999; Ali and Alpaslan, 2017) of the type:
HCit= 1j+
X
p
k=111ikHCit k+
X
p
k=112ikSKit k+1i"it 1+u1it; (17)
SKit= 2j+
X
p
k=121ikSKit k+
X
p
k=122ikHCit k+2i"it 1+u2it; (18)
where  is the rst-di¤erence operator; p is the optimal lag length determined by
Schwarz information criterion. The null hypothesis of no short-run causality can be
examined, respectively, based on H0:12ik = 0 and H0:22ik = 0 for all ik. However,
long-run causality can be tested by the statistical signicance of, respectively, 1i
and 2i (the error correction terms) using standard t-statistics.
[Table 5 about here]
The results are reported in Table 5. As can be seen, we fail to nd any statistically
signicant relationship between human capital and the stock of knowledge in the
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short run. However, there is a signicant two-way causal link between the two in the
long run. This is consistent with the so-called implementation innovationand the
predictions of the human capital and R&D sector equations of the theoretical model.
5.4 Robustness
The parsimonious specication we adopted in our empirical estimations so far is
wholly informed by the super consistent properties of the panel cointegration methods
we employ. Given that these are, under cointegration, robust to omitted variable
bias, reduced-form models such as equation (16) are valid. In addition, since the
theoretical OLG model we use has a long-term time horizon, the empirical methods
we have employed so far are appropriate.
In this section, however, we attempt to fully estimate our human capital sector
equation (Eq. 8). In particular, we re-examine how the stock of knowledge inuences
human capital controlling for per capita education expenditure, public infrastruc-
ture (proxied by per capita transport and communication expenditure), and the
average human capital of the previous generation (proxied by the average human
capital values of the rst 5 years of the sample period). Our dataset is slightly re-
duced as the public spending data is only available until 2012. The source of this data
is the Statistics of Public Expenditure for Economic Development (SPEED) which
has been compiled by IFPRI (2015). All the explanatory variables are expressed in
natural logarithm.
[Table 6 about here]
We rst estimate the empirical counterpart of equation (8) using the pooled
ordinary least squares (POLS) estimator. As shown in column [1] of Table 6, all the
variables carry the expected positive sign and are all signicant at conventional levels
(5%). However, since the POLS estimator is biased in the presence of unobserved
country-specic e¤ects, we report in column [2] estimates based on the random e¤ects
estimator. On the whole, the results remain largely similar.
Given that macroeconomic data series tend to be plagued by panel heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation, we test for group wise heteroscedasticity and serial cor-
relation using the modied Wald test (Greene, 2000) and the Wooldridge (2002) test,
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respectively. While the RE estimator can handle the rst, neither it nor the POLS
can handle serial correlation. This can lead to consistent but ine¢ cient estimates
(Baltagi, 2006). The Wooldridge test suggests that the within country residuals are
serially correlated while the Wald test conrms heteroscedasticity. Hence, to over-
come these potential biases, we use Feasible GLS (FGLS) where we allow for the
presence of autocorrelation within panels and heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional
correlation across panels. As can be seen in column [3], the results remain consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model.
Finally, none of these estimators can handle endogeneity which may arise from
omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse causality. Hence, the results on the nal
column are based on the two-step system GMM estimator developed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator applies a system
of equations, one in levels and one in di¤erences, and uses lagged rst di¤erences of
the regressors as instruments in the rst case and lagged levels of the dependent and
explanatory variables as instruments in the latter case. We test the validity of the
instruments using the Hansen J test. Following Roodman (2009), we collapse the
instrument count in order not to overt the endogenous variables. Needless to say,
our results remain unchanged.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted to account for the spillover e¤ect of the existing stock
of ideas on learning by extending the model developed by Agénor and Neanidis
(2015). The spillover e¤ect promotes the innovation capacity of countries in adopt-
ing imported technologies and developing new technologies. At the same time, the
production of new designs depends positively on the average human capital of indi-
viduals. Thus, there is a two-way interaction between human capital and innovation
or the so-called implementation innovation.
Using various empirical methods, we conrm the above theoretical ideas. In
particular, we show that the stock of technical knowledge has a signicant long-
run e¤ect on the accumulation of human capital and that there is a two-way causal
feedback between the two in the long run.
In order to study the transitional dynamics of the model and to illustrate the
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impact of public policy, the model was calibrated using average data for low-income
countries and sensitivity analysis was reported under di¤erent parameter congura-
tions. Based on the numerical analysis, we illustrate potential trade-o¤s associated
with the provision of infrastructure and other productive components, namely, the
allocation of public spending to R&D and education. The ndings of the numerical
analysis indicate that, due to the limited amount of resources governments have,
trade-o¤s in the allocation of public spending may inevitably emerge. More speci-
cally, government interventions may indirectly a¤ect the capacity of sectors to inno-
vate through spillover e¤ects. However, investment in infrastructure at the expense
of spending on R&D is less likely to succeed in promoting growth, whereas it may
be more e¤ective to foster economic growth through an o¤setting cut in another
productive component of public spending, education.
The ndings of the paper highlight a number of important issues. First, the
development of innovative technological sectors can indirectly improve growth via
its positive inuence on human capital accumulation as much as human capital can
as an important input into the generation and di¤usion of innovative ideas. Second,
infrastructure investments remain an important channel through which developing
countries can galvanise their economies. Finally, given that potential trade-o¤s may
arise in the allocation of public spending, governments in low-income countries need
to use their limited budgets as part of holistic measures in order to achieve e¢ cient
outcomes.
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Appendix A
Dynamic System and Steady-State Growth
Substituting for st from (3) in (2) yields the lifetime budget constraint,
ctt +
ctt+1
1 + rt+1
= (1  )etwt: (A1)
Each individual maximises (1) with respect to ctt and c
t
t+1, subject to the in-
tertemporal budget constraint (A1) and ctt; c
t
t+1 > 0. The rst-order conditions give
the standard Euler equation
ctt+1
ctt
=
1 + rt+1
C(1 + )
: (A2)
Substituting this result in (A1) yields
ctt = [
C(1 + )
1 + C(1 + )
](1  )etwt; (A3)
so that
st = (1  )etwt; (A4)
where  = 1= [1 + C(1 + )] < 1 is the marginal propensity to save.
Substituting this result in (14) yields
KPt+1 = (1  )etwt N: (A5)
From (11) and (13),
KIt+1 = Ietwt N: (A6)
Combining (A5) and (A6), this expression yields
kIt+1 =
KIt+1
KPt+1
=
I
(1  ) = J; (A7)
which is constant over time.
To study the dynamics, note rst that (6), together with (A7), yields
Yt = J
"m
=
t z

t x

tK
P
t ; (A8)
where, as dened in the text, mt =Mt=KPt and zt = Et=K
P
t .
Prot of rm i in the nal sector, Yi;t, is given by
Yi;t = Y
i
t   (1 + 't)
MtX
1
pstx
i
s;t   wYt EtNYi;t   rtKP;it ; (A9)
where the price of the nal good normalised to unity, pst is the price of intermediate
good s, wYt the wage rate in the nal good production sector, rt the rental rate of
private capital, and transportation costs, 't, distort the distribution of intermediate
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goods to producers of the nal good and assumed to be a decreasing function of the
public-private capital ratio; 't = '(k
I
t ), where '(0) > 0, '
0 < 0, and limkIt!1't = 0.
Each producer maximises prots subject to (4) with respect to private inputs,
labour and capital, and demand for all intermediate goods xis;t, 8s, taking factor
prices, Mt, and 't as given:
rt = 
Y it
KP;it
, wYt = 
Y it
EtNYi;t
; (A10)
xis;t = [
Zit
(1 + 't)p
s
t
]1=(1 ); s = 1; :::Mt;
or given that each rm demands the same amount of each intermediate good, the
aggregate demand for intermediate good s is
xs;t =
Z 1
0
xis;tdi =
Z 1
0
[
Zit
(1 + 't)p
s
t
]1=(1 )di; (A11)
where
Zit = Y
i
t =
MtX
1
(xis;t)
; (A12)
Note that all rms are idential and their number is normalised to unity, Zt = Zit , 8i,
and the total demand for intermediate goods is the same across rms, xit = xt, 8i.
Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium, xis;t = x
i
t, 8s. ThusZ 1
0
[
MtX
1
(xis;t)
]1=di =M
1=
t xt: (A13)
Or equivalently, substituting (A11) into (7), together with Zit = Zt, 8i, and then
maximising with respect to pst , taking Zt and 't as given, yields the optimal price
Is;t = (p
s
t   )[
Zt
(1 + 't)p
s
t
]1=(1 ); (A14)
pst = pt =


: 8s (A15)
From the denition of Zit in (A12), and using (A15), in equilibrium Zt = Yt=Mtx

t ,
equation (A10) takes the form
xt =

(1 + 't)
(
Yt
Mt
); (A16)
or equivalently, equation (A16) can be rewritten, together with (A7),
xt =

[1 + '(J)]
(
Yt
KPt
KPt
Mt
) =

[1 + '(J)]
(
Yt
KPt
)m 1t : (A17)
27
Substituting this result in (A8) and rearranging yields
(
Yt
KPt
)1  = [
J"()
[1 + '(J)]
]zt m
(= )
t ; (A18)
that is,
Yt
KPt
= 1m
	1
t z

1
t ; (A19)
where
1 = [
J"()
[1 + '(J)]
]1=(1 );
	1 =
( 1   1)
1   ;

1 =

1   :
Equations (A15) and (A16) can be substituted into (7):
It =
(1  )
1 + 't
(
Yt
Mt
): (A20)
The arbitrage condition is
pMt = 
I
t : (A21)
From (A7), (A20), and (A21),
pMt =
(1  )
1 + '(J)
(
Yt
Mt
);
which can be rearranged to give
pMt =
(1  )
1 + '(J)
(
Yt
KPt
)m 1t : (A22)
From (11),
Ght = hetwt
N: h = E;R (A23)
Prot of R&D rms, Rt , is given by
max
NRt
Rt = p
M
t (Mt+1  Mt)  wRt EtNRt ; (A24)
where NRt  0, and taking wages, wRt , the patent price, pMt , and the public-private
capital ratio, the initial stock of designs, as well as government spending on R&D,
as given.
Equation (A24) can be solved for
wRt 

(
GRt
Et
)1(
Mt
Et
)2(kIt )
3

pMt : (A25)
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Substituting (A22) and (A23) for h = R in (A25), holding with equality, and
using (A7), yields, with wRt = wt,
wt = (Rwt N)
1(mtz
 1
t )
2J3
(1  )
1 + '(J)
(
Yt
KPt
)m 1t : (A26)
Substituting (A19) in (A26) yields the equilibrium wage as a function of mt and
zt.
wt = 2m
	2
t z

2
t ; (A27)
with
2 =

(R)
1 N1J3
(1  )
1 + '(J)
1
1=(1 1)
;
	2 =
	1 + 2   1
1  1
;

2 =

1   2
1  1
:
Now, from (10), (A7), and (A23) for h = E, noting that Mt=Et = mtz 1t ,
Et+1
Et
= (
GEt
NEt
)1(
Mt
Et
)2(
KIt
KPt
)3 = (Ewt)
1(mtz
 1
t )
2J3 ;
or equivalently, using (A27) to eliminate wt,
Et+1
Et
= 3m
	3
t z

3
t ; (A28)
where
3 = (E2)
1J3 ;
	3 = 	21 + 2;

3 = 
21   2:
Using (A5), (A27), and (A28), the dynamics of zt are determined by
zt+1 = 4m
	4
t z

4
t ; (A29)
where
4 =
3
2(1  ) N ;
	4 = 	3  	2;

4 = 
3   
2:
Next, we need to determine the dynamics of mt. Dividing (9) by Mt yields
Mt+1
Mt
= 1 + (
GRt
Et
)1(ztm
 1
t )
1 2(kIt )
3(
NRt
N
);
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or equivalently, using (A7) and (A23) for h = R,
Mt+1
Mt
= 1 + [
(R N)
1J3
N
](
zt
mt
)1 2w1t N
R
t : (A30)
To eliminate NRt from this expression, equation (15), together with equation
(A10), yields equilibrium employment in the R&D sector:
NRt =
N   ( Yt
Et
)w 1t : (A31)
We can substitute (A27) for wt in (A31) to give
NRt =
N   ( Yt
KPt
)z 1t (2m
	2
t z

2
t )
 1: (A32)
Substituting (A19), (A27), and (A32) in (A30) yields
Mt+1
Mt
= 1 + 5m
	5
t z

5
t

N   6m	6t z
6t

; (A33)
where
5 = (2R)
1J3 N1 1;
	5 = 2   1 + 	21;

5 = 1  2 + 
21;
6 = 
1
2
;
	6 = 	1  	2;

6 = 
1   
2   1:
Combining (A5) and (A33) yields, noting that Mt=Et = mtz 1t ,
mt+1 =
1 + 5m
	5
t z

5
t

N   6m	6t z
6t

(1  )wt N mtz
 1
t :
Substituting (A27) in this expression and rearranging yields
mt+1 =
1 + 5m
	5
t z

5
t

N   6m	6t z
6t

7m
	7
t z

7
t
; (A34)
where
7 = 2(1  ) N;
	7 = 	2   1;

7 = 1 + 
2:
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From (A29) and (A34), in the steady-state,
~z =

4 ~m
	4
	1=
; (A35)
~m =
(
1 + 5 ~m
	5~z
5

N   6 ~m	6~z
6

7~z
7
)1=
; (A36)
where
 = 1  
4;
 = 1 + 	7:
From (A19), in the steady-state,
(
~Y
KP
) = 1 ~m
	1~z
1 ; (A37)
which implies that output grows also at the same rate as KPt and other aggregate
variables.
From (A27), the steady-state wage rate is
~w = 2 ~m
	2~z
2 : (A38)
From (A28) and (A33), the steady-state growth rate of the economy can be
written in two equivalent forms:
Y = 3m
	3
t z

3
t   1; (A39)
Y = 5m
	5
t z

5
t

N   6m	6t z
6t

: (A40)
To determine the level of output and its growth rate during the transition, from
(A19),
Yt = 1m
	1
t z

1
t K
P
t ; (A41)
which requires the path of KPt , and therefore equation (A5) can be divided by K
P
t :
KPt+1
KPt
= (1  )etwt N;
which can be rewritten, together with (A27),
KPt+1
KPt
= 2(1  )m	2t z1+
2t N;
or equivalently,
KPt
KPt 1
= 2(1  )m	2t 1z1+
2t 1 N: (A42)
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Table 2 
  
Increase in Share of Government Spending on Infrastructure Investment 1/  
(Absolute deviations from baseline)    
   
Financed by a Cut in  Unproductive spending Education R&D activities   
Benchmark Values  Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0141 -0.0626 0.0138 0.0456 -0.0165 -0.0710 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.0494 0.0098 -0.0273 -0.0019 0.0569 -0.0026 
  
Experiment: ν3 = 0.1 2/ Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0346 -0.1338 -0.0075 -0.0382 -0.0369 -0.1432 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.1116 0.0192 0.0305 0.0070 0.1196 0.0061 
  
Experiment: φ3 = 0.1 3/ Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0183 -0.0852 0.0088 0.0218 -0.0188 -0.0867 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.0430 0.0160 -0.0330 0.0053 0.0498 0.0052 
  
Experiment: ν2 = 0.4 4/ Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0157 -0.0512 0.0152 0.0360 -0.0177 -0.0560 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.0491 0.0075 -0.0271 -0.0006 0.0563 -0.0044 
  
Experiment: ν2 = 0.6 Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0173 -0.0367 0.0166 0.0249 -0.0190 -0.0387 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.0487 0.0055 -0.0269 0.0005 0.0558 -0.0057 
  
Experiment:  φ2 = 0.7 with ν2 = 0.6 5/ Impact Long run Impact  Long run Impact  Long run 
  
Public-private capital stock ratio  0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 0.0504 
  
Technical knowledge-human capital ratio  -0.0175 -0.0355 0.0167 0.0240 -0.0190 -0.0370 
  
Growth rate of final output 0.0464 0.0046 -0.0248 0.0011 0.0533 -0.0065 
  
1/ Increase in ʋI from 0.061 to 0.081.  
        
2/ ν3 is the elasticity of human capital with respect to public-private capital ratio and is set equal to 0.0 in the benchmark case.  
 
3/ φ3 is the elasticity of the flow of new ideas with respect to public-private capital ratio and is set equal to 0.0 in the benchmark case. 
4/ ν2 is the elasticity of human capital with respect to externality of technical knowledge and is set equal to 0.3 in the benchmark case.  
5/ φ2 is the elasticity of the flow of new ideas with respect to existing stock of ideas and is set equal to 0.6 in the benchmark case. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Figure 2 
Increase in Infrastructure Investment 
Financed by a Cut in Spending on Education 
(Absolute deviations from baseline) 
 
 
        
Notes: Increase in I from 0.061 to 0.081, financed by a cut in E. ν₂ is the elasticity of human capital with respect to 
externality of technical knowledge and φ2 is the elasticity of the flow of new ideas with  respect to existing stock of ideas. They 
are set equal to 0.3 and 0.6 respectively in the benchmark case. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table B1: Summary Statistics – Main Results 
 
Obs. Mean Sd. Min. Max. 
HC (ln) 1225 1.068 0.163 0.385 1.318 
Stock of knowledge (ln) 1225 8.637 1.916 1.902 13.615 
 
 
Table B2: Summary Statistics – Extension Results 
 
Obs. Mean Sd. Min. Max. 
HC (ln) 1155 1.061 0.163 0.385 1.313 
Stock of knowledge (ln) 1155 8.642 1.899 2.721 13.615 
Initial HC (ln) 1155 0.952 0.175 0.498 1.208 
Education exp. (ln) 1084 6.594 0.976 3.798 8.194 
Infrastructure (ln) 1044 5.711 1.182 1.247 8.275 
      
List of Countries: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; Cyprus; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Korea; Luxembourg; Malta; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; 
Portugal; Romania; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; United Kingdom; United States. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Panel unit root and cointegration results 
 
 
 
Table 4: The impact of the stock of knowledge on human capital 
 𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡  N Observations 
WD-DOLS (Kao and Chiang, 2000) 0.020 (0.010)** 35 980 
MG-DOLS (Pedroni, 2001) 0.023 (0.006)** 35 980 
2-step estimator (Breitung, 2005) 0.045 (0.010)** 35 980 
Notes:  Standard errors in parenthesis. ** indicates significance at the 5% or lower.  
The DOLS estimates include three leads and lags. The dependent variable is human 
capital. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
 Panel A: Panel unit root tests 
 MW IPS  CIPS  
 Levels Diff Levels Diff Levels Diff 
Human capital 60.61 136.02** -0.94 -1.93** -1.87 -1.77 
Patent stock 74.54 120.30** -1.39 -2.33** -1.52 -2.33** 
  Panel B: Panel cointegration tests 
 Panel υ Panel ρ Panel PP Panel ADF Group ρ Group PP Group ADF 
Pedroni tests 6.72** -2.27** -4.74** 2.76** -3.06** -7.50** 1.85 
  Gt Ga Pt Pa  
Westerlund tests  -2.88** -55.65** -14.81** -37.69**  
Notes:  MW, IPS and CIPS indicate Maddala and Wu (1999), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Pesaran (2007) panel unit root tests, 
respectively. Three lags used in the unit root tests to account for autocorrelation and the tests include an intercept. The MW test is 
computed using an asymptotic Chi -square distribution; the other tests assume asymptotic normality. ** indicates rejection of the null 
of non-stationarity and no cointegration at the 5% level or lower. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
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Table 5: Dynamic panel causality 
Dependent variable Source of causality (independent variable) 
 Short-run  Long-run 
 𝛥𝐻𝐶 𝛥𝑆𝐾  𝐸𝐶𝑇 
𝛥𝐻𝐶 - -0.001 (0.001)  0.029 (0.003)** 
𝛥𝑆𝐾 -4.182 (6.648)  -  0.697 (0.388)* 
Notes:  ECT represents the coefficient of the error correction terms, respectively. 
** and * indicate that the null hypothesis of no causal link is rejected at the 5%  
and 10%, respectively. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Robustness – estimation of the full theoretical model 
 POLS RE FGLS 2-step SGMM 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Stock of knowledge 0.008 
[0.001]*** 
0.008 
[0.003]*** 
0.002 
[0.003]* 
0.030 
[0.013]** 
Initial human capital 0.662 
[0.021]*** 
0.668 
[0.074]*** 
0.753 
[0.024]*** 
0.485 
[0.066]*** 
Education expenditure 0.025 
[0.004]*** 
0.076 
[0.004]*** 
0.008 
[0.001]*** 
0.175 
[0.016]*** 
Public infrastructure 0.012 
[0.005]** 
0.002 
[0.003] 
0.001 
[0.001]* 
0.025 
[0.009]* 
Constant 0.128 
[0.035] 
-0.150 
[0.778] 
0.024 
[0.029] 
-0.958 
[0.192] 
Observations 1034 1034 1034 1034 
R
2
 0.63    
Wooldridge test (p-values) 0.000 
0.000 
  
Modified Wald test (p-values)   
# Countries (# instruments)    35 (22) 
AR (2)    0.394 
Hansen test    0.109 
Notes:  Standard errors in brackets, the Wooldridge test is distributed as F under the null of 
no autocorrelation. The modified Wald test is distributed as chi-squared under the null of no 
heteroscedasticity across the panels. The AR (2) is the Arellano-Bond’s 2nd autocorrelation test. 
The Hansen J statistic reports the p-values for the null of instrument validity. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms. 
The dependent variable is human capital. 
 
 
 
